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LOGIC v. COMMON SENSE IN PLEADING

The N ecessit)' of Fact-Pleading
experiment in pleading-or the suppression of
M ICHIGAN'S
pleading-is being carefully watched throughout the country.
Not that it is likely that many other states will go 1.o the
extreme, for it is an extreme, of substituting notice-pleading for
essential-fact-pleading: but it is a fact that even the code states are
experiencing a reaction in that general direction. It will probably
lead to a. multiplication of their "short forms,'' rather than to a
sweeping provision that
"no declaration shall be deemed insufficient which shall contain such information as shall reasonably inform the defendant of the nature of. the case he is called upon to defend."1
It is not entirely that they are unable to perceive the advantage of
such freedom. Many of them have had long experiences with formless pleadings in municipal courts (from one of the greatest of
which this very idea is taken) and in the courts of justices of the
peace that preceded them. In criminal law they have, of course,
be<.>n accustomed to the most general of general issues, one having
the exact effect of the new Michigan general issue in civil actions,
"a demand by the defendant of a trial of the matters set forth in
the plaintiff's declaration." 2 In procedure before quasi-judicial
commissions they are becoming accustomed to various degrees of
informality. Yet they have not taken kindly to the abolition of essential-fact-pleading in ordinary civil cases. 8 •
The reason is not a mere love of perversity. A provision for some
kind of fact-pleading seems essential. That is, the functions that
have heretofore been served by fact-pleading in Anglo-American
law must still be served somehow. \Ve may postpone the process
to the time of the trial ; we may simplify it to the highest degree;
we may leave it to be implied by the lawyers and the Court on the
basis of their general knowledge: but somewhere, somehow, we must
frame an issue in every dispute before the dispute can be decided.
That the framing of an issue is the only function served by pleadings, I do not maintain. Pleadings have been used as a repository
'The Judicature Act of 1915, ch. xiv, § 2, based on Rule 15 of the Chicago Municipal
Court.
: Ibid, § u.
•Clarke Butler \Vhittier, Notice Pleading, 31 Harvard La"· Review, 501.
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of evidence. They have been relied upon for the purpose of giving
notice to an adversary of that on which he ·must be prepared at the
time of trial. They have served the purpose of permanent and official records of matters adjudicated or at least of summaries of that
which happens from day to day in the courts. Incidentally, they
have from time to time become the embodiment of the substantive
law and have served the function of digests or codes, reversing the
maxim "no right without a remedy," so as to limit one's rights by
reference to his remedies. Under our jury system they have served
the legitimate function of distinguishing between issues of fact and
issues of law, and the questionable function of taking as many cases
as possible away from the jury. At the same time, pleadings have
served some less desirable purposes: they have developed technicalities that have tended from time to time to encumber the administration of justice, or to thwart it, and they have served their part in
the preservation of the monopoly in the handling of litigation for
men of special training. Yet we should hardly lay down any of
these secondary functions today as the ultimate purpose of pleading,
any more than we should its incidental effect-to terrify freshmen.
Still if anyone insists that the framing of an issue is not the all
important aim of pleading, and urges the shaping of the future of
pleading on the basis of any other function,4 I shall not quarrel with
him provided he can give me a better name for whatever does serve
this necessary function, which, at least in the common law of England and ·America, has been served and is being served by written
statements of the essential f<!-Gts on which a claim or a defense depends.

T7.oo Ideals of Pleading-In Theor:>'
If we grant, however grudgingly, that some scheme of pleading,
in this old sense, some mechanism by w4ich an issue mq.y be framed,
is necessary, we still have a wide latitude of choice among devices
offered to us, on the one hand by logic and on the other by common
sense.
• I am aware of a tendency, especially in Michigan, to regard the giving of notice
as the mo~t important function of pleading. "The purpose of pleading," says a Michigan
court, "is to enable the defendant to prepare his defense." Malloy v. Grand Trunk Ry.
Co., 158 N. \V. 854, 855. Cf. Edson R. Sunderland in 14 Michigan Law Review 552,
where the distinction between the notice-giving and issue-framing functions is recognized.
Professor Whittier has declared (4 lllinois Law R<oview 178) and Dean Pound has quoted
with approval (ib. 495): "The chief object of pleading [is] to notify the parties respectively of the claims or defenses which will be advanced by their opponents and attempted
to be proved at the trial." It is suggested, with deference, that while procedural reform
based on this principle may be timely, for reasons stated below, the principle itself can·
not be accepted without qualifications as to time and place.
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There is a tendency today to minimize the importance of the logic
element and to emphasize the common sense of the situation and
possibly to go to extremes in the name of common sense. The Michigan experiment, I believe, is but one of many manifestations of this
tendency. It is not limited to the ranks of the lawyers who have
become sated with the idiosyncrasies of a rigid set of rules. There
is little doubt as to how a group of intelligent laymen would react
to the following questions (I have tried them on freshmen): Should
a man's theory of his case be tried or should a decision ·be rendered
on the merits? On the merits, of course. Should his words be interpreted strictly against him or liberally, so as to do substantial
justice between the parties? This question is hardly worth answering. Should the pleadings control the evidence or should the evidence be made the basis of a shaping or reshaping of the pleadings?
It is an insult to the intelligence of the twentieth century to suggest
that pleadings should keep out essential facts, for the presentation
of which they are only as a means to an end. Should ordinary and
concise language be the ideal of the pleader, or should words of art
be carefully used and required in appropriate places? Words of art
are, of course, consigned to perdition along with the Latin of the
physician's prescription. Should a man be compelled to classify his
case, and to proceed in accordance with the rules recognized in cases
of a particular class, or should he leave the process to the tribunal
and run no risk of selecting the wrong weapon from the arsenal of
the law? Classification is but the shell of the law of yesterday-the
living law of today must cast it off if it is to grow. If a man really
has two possible defenses or two possible theories on either of which
he may succeed, shall he be forced to choose one at the outset and
stand or fall by it? Full justice, of course, requires the ventilation
of every possible theory. In short, the ideal of common sense in
pleading needs no recommendation, at least as matters now stand.
A little cross-examination, however, may check some of the testimony of our lay-witnesses. \.Vould they go so far ~s to force a man
without any previous notice to prove in court a matter that had n()t
been questioned in the pleadings? Hardly-some arrangement must
be made to avoid that extreme. Would they encourage "sloppy'"
pleading, bearing in mind how easily that may be degenerated into
tricky pleading? Of course not. On the whole, are not certainty and
directness to be preferred to obscurity and prolixity in pleading?
Yes, provided the price paid is not too high. Would they permit a
man who had used a technical expression as a weapon to hide behind a "Pickwickian sense" when he finds that technicality working
out to his own disadvantage? That, of course, would be unfair. In
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view of the complicated nature of human relations, aren't technical
expressions, words of art, quite necessary for the purpose of exact
definition of issues? Certainly. We should hardly write a treatise
on chemistry without technical terms-why then a presentation of
human relations? Surely a man who wishes to make use of the public courts either for offense or defense ought to be held to a strict
accountability with reference to the court's time. vVhy shouldn't
he be expected to find out in advance exactly what he wants and on
what basis he claims it? Undoubtedly there is much to be said in
favor of such a demand, but the question of how strictly one should
be limited to the theory he selects, is a question of degree.

The Two Ideals in History
Thus gradually the case against the non-logical ideal may be weakened though by no means broken down. At least, there are two sides
to the case. There are two ideals--constantly struggling with each
other, yielding now an inch on this side and now an inch on that,
but neither beaten in the contest. In the light of this struggle .the
whole history of pleading, at least in Anglo-American law, may be
reinterpreted. It then becomes an intelligible and even a fascinating
account of two tendencies in human nature ; a spirit is breathed into
the dry rules of pleading and they live.
The conflict between these two ideals, logic and common sense.
between certainty and justice, is old-very old. It is not limited to
Anglo-American law. Its universality and continuity have frequently been observed, but generally only to illustrate a single line of development, the gradual emancipation of substantive law from the
shackles of adjective law. The extent of this emancipation in any
particular society is therefore taken as a reiiable measure of its
progress. In fact, what I have here called the struggle between two
ideals becomes the struggle of but one· ideal against the forces of
darkness, and the history of enlightenment becomes a history of
the triumph of substance over form. The idea has been common
since the days of Sir Henry Maine.
"So great." says he, "is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive
law hac; at first the look of being gradually secreted in the
interstices of Procedure." 5
• Earlv Law and Custom, 389. The same idea is expressed in Early History of In·
stitutions, 252. Cf. Holmes, The Common Law, 253: ''Whenever we trace a legal doctrine
of substantive Jaw far enough back, we are likely to find some forgotten circumstance of
procedure at its source."
0
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In general, we are told, "legal technicality is a disease not of old
age, but of the infancy of societies." In a very general way this
theory is borne out by a comparison of medireval and modern procedure. In early law it was fatal to a man's case to fail to "defend
the words which ought to be defended." Such substantive law as
has come down to us from early times has been preserved by clinging to parts of adjective law for dear life. No doubt the subsequent
history of the law of rights has been greatly affected by the nature
of the procedural law to which it is attached. Still it is going a
little too far to suppose that in the first instance rights were created
by remedies. At most procedure may have hardened custom into
law, but the relations presupposed in the customs are human relations, made not in the courts but in every-day life. Crystallized
codes of procedure are the results of a process of development just
as crystallized rules of substantive law are, and in the process of
their development they are influenced by the substantive law perhaps even more than the substantive law is influenced by them.
Remedies may become defined and crystallized more quickly than
rights, and may then exercise a retarding influence on the development of rights.0 Yet too much has been said of late about the formative influence of procedure and not enough about the manner in
which procedure reflects and is subservient to the substantive law
of the times.
The simplicity of the old explanation of a continuous progress
from adjective to substantive law is alluring-but it is a will-of-thewisp. It is really futile to try to determine whether the formality
of early law preceded substantive notions, or whether they themselves were preceded by a substratum of informal law. This much
is clear: human nature, on its intellectual side has driven us to formality, the instrument of logic and certainty, and inertia has frequently kept us going in that direction beyond the point approved
by common sense. The evil has generally brought with it its own
remedy. A reaction has set in, in which another side of human nature has revolted against the dictates of formal logic. At a certain
point the reaction itself is checked and a development in the opposite
direction is begun again.
One may wonder how, in a matter requiring the highest mental
capacities, a depreciation of logic can be tolerated at any time. Yet
such is the case not only in pleading but also in other branches of
the law. Take that remarkable volume of ultra-modem essays on
• Charles McGuffey Hepburn, Historical Development of Code Pleading in America
and England, 31.
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The Science of Legal Method,1 and consider the impression it has
made on the mind of a logician.
""What strikes a logician as most curious is that this movement of challenge and reconstruction should take the form
of an attack on 'logic.' There is surely a strange paradox
here, is there not? * * * Geny recommends the lawyer to
realize that the elements of every system of positive law 'are
not logical entities, but those ethical and economic realities
which alone can give us an insight into the effective forces of
social life' (page 42). Ehrlich, after his fashion, is refreshingly vigorous: 'Of all the gifts of the human intellect, logical
acumen is the least fruitful. There is profound wisdom in
the fact that German legend frequently portrays the devil as
a sharp dialectician' (page 84). Gmelin inveighs against
those who 'care everything for formal logic and nothing for
the sense of justice' (page 140). Kiss contrasts the Roman
idea of 'aequitas' which kept the interpretation of the law
plastic, with the 'degenerate' scholastic application of it by
•formal dialectic logic' (page 154 et seq.). Berolzheimer calls
for emancipation from 'the letter of the law' (page 167).
Such an authority as Dean Pound decalres 'application of
law must involve not logic merely but a measure of discretion
as well,' and he adds that the law cannot be made 'purely mechanical in its operation' (page 208). ·wurzel records the
appearance at the present time of the postulate that juridical
thinking is 'to have even the courage of being illogical' (page

297)."
And so in pleading, too, there appears at this particular time a
desire to get away from logical formul~. It must not be supposed,
however, that this is the first time in the history of mankind that
vent has been given to such feelings as these. The entire modern
history of pleading, between the Year Books and the modern codes,
has been filled with a struggle to tone down the harshnesses of that
rigidly logical system that grew up in the Year Books. In the realm
of substantive lai.v this attitude produced Equity. In pleading it
produced v<i.rious devices by which, illogically to be sure, a pleader
was permitted to put more than one point in issue. That is the historical significance of the General Issue and the Replication de
injuria-and numerous other deviations from the strictly logical
plan of mediGeval pleading. Indeed many of the most difficult, most
~Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Volume 9, Boston, 1917. l quote below from the
remarkable re\•iew by R. F. Alfred Hoernle, in 31 Harvard Law Review 807.
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unreasonable, most technical provisions that have made a chimera
of common law pleading are these very concessions to common sense.
In the beginning Qf the nineteenth century the most marked defect
in common law pleading was not its injustice but its irregularity, not
its narrowness but its cumbersomeness, not its strictness but its uncertainty. As I read the Hilary Rules of the fourth year of 'William
IV, it seems that what the judges were attempting to accomplish by
. virtue of the authority vested in them by Parliament, was to sweep
away these irregularities, to simplify, codify, and make certain the
rules to be followed by the pleader. On this side of the Atlantic
the same desire for certainty was at least one of the elements in the
complex mass of motives that made for pleading reform. Simplification was the keynote both of codification and of the other modifications to which common law pleading was subjected. It is true there
was also a desire to prevent the miscarriage of justice that technical
pleading had so often produced. But this last motive was probably
stronger among the people than in the profession itself. The consequence has been that the courts have generally construed the code
as a reenactment of so much of common law pleading as was not
absolutely inconsistent with its terms. In course of time the codes
have been interpreted and reinterpreted-as all codes are. Every
word has been subjected to the pro.:ess of glossation. Logical conclusions have been spun from the very commas in the code so that
today in the code states logic seems to have the upper hand in the
contest with common sense. The popular desire, always on the
side of common sense, seems however to be winning over professional opinion as a reaction-and this, rather than the success of
the squire's court's methods, is the explanation of the attempt today
to do away with all fact-pleading.

The True Significance of the Present Trend
The situation is exactly like that which develops in the history of
codes in other branches of law.8 Constitutional law, for example,
the first part of our law to be codified in this country, has gone
through a period of verbal interpretation that seems to be passing
• I have traced 'this post-mortem history of codes in several connections in 65 Uni·
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 665, 31 Harvard Law Review 373, 27 Yale Law
Journal 31. A close parallel could be drawn in the history of pleading showing alterna·
tions between periods of strict law and periods of equity, with the se\•eral transitional
stages. It is enough for our present purposes, however, to note that Anglo-American
pleadings have twice in history been reduced to something like a rigid code, sufficiently
definite in letter to make the spirit secondary. The first we may date sometime in the
1400s, perhaps a generation or two before the publication of the Lioer Intratiomnn, .1510.
The other is the period of re,·isions and codes about the middle of the nineteenth century.
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away before a new spirit of realism. The newer codes, on the other
hand, are just entering into their periods of word quibbles. The
decisions, for example, on the Negotiable Instruments and the Sales
codes have degenerated in the last few years into quarrels as to
whether the word "value" means one thing or another in a certain
place, and whether the back of an instrument is really the back of
it. In passing, it may be encouraging to remember that this is but
a transitory phase of statutory interpretation, and that we may hope
in course of time for a reaction against this particular kind of logic
in these fields.
·when the reaction finally sets in there is apt to be a feeling on the
part of those who take part in it that they are really independent of
the narrow past. As a matter of fact, the habits of thinking formed
in that narrow past are not so easily shaken off. We are just beginning to learn how much of the equity of the chancellors was really
a reflection of the strict law of earlier times. Equity follows the law
in more !.'enses than one. In like manner those who today declare
their independence of ancient rules of pleading may be enabled to do
so largely by reason of the general habit of implying what that older
pleading had expressed. Here, I believe, we have a true explanation
of the success in Michigan at the present day of notice-pleading, a
system by the way for which Michigan courts had prepared the way
before the adoption of the Judicature Act of 1915. We must remember that those little names of types of cases, "assumpsit," "trespass
on the case," and so on, tell us a great part of a man's story. If a
code-state \vere to try noti7e-pleading, it would soon find itself handicapped by the lack of them. As matters stand the defendant, the
judge, the jury, the lawyers, everybody knows by implication, what
is meant when a traction company is sued by an injured pedestrian
for damages. They know that negligence is the basis of the alleged
liability, and they know, as a matter of .fact, almost everything that
goes to make up the average case of this variety. In like manner
in all of the commonest forms of cases that fill our courts, a little
imagination is sufficient to enable us to supply, out of our experience
with past cases, the framework of the entire transaction. But there
are also unusual cases, and those that are usual today may be less
usual as civilization progresses and life changes. The very same
considerations that have made it necessary to struggle away from
the fixed forms of pleading of the past will surely make it necessary
to do something to fill in the gaps of a system of pleading which is
adequate for today only, because based on implications which we
inherit from the immediate past and which are valid for only the
peculiar factc;; of today.
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Jn one sense a system of pleading is to be judged solely by its
usefulness for the time being. It is a means to an end. When the
need arrives, the advocates of notice-pleading may tell us, a more
elaborate pleading can easily be developed. "The forms of declaration now in common use" may still be employed.9 But it is all a
question of degree. To what extent is it desirable-or even safeto conceal or deny the process of the framing of an issue? To what
extent should be deliberately worked out before the trial; to what
extent should it be left to the judge at the trial or after the trial ?10
There is a danger line somewhere, and the further we go beyond
it, the more violent will be the reaction, in the opposite direction.

The Cru:i: of the Matter-Common Sense and !ttdici.al Freedom
Whether desirable or not it is hardly likely that experimentation
in the neighborhood of the danger line will be permitted to the
courts in many of our states. There is a practical consideration that
seems likely to cut short the career of common sense in pleading
long before the danger line is reached in this country. It is the
jealousy of the power of officers that inheres in a democratic government. Jn the final analysis the common sense ideal is inextricably
interwoven with the extension of the discretion of the court, especially the trial court. Distrust of courts on the other hand, on the
part of our legislatures not only gives proceedings in error their
lease on life, but also becomes the fountain head of mechanical legislative rules that must be mechanically applied. It may be good to
talk about a freer interpretation of the law by the courts-they will
•Judicature Act of 1915, ch. xiv, § "·
Is a judgment based on factless pleadings entitled to "full faith and credit" under
the Constitution of the United States, in a sister state? In passing on foreign judgments
it has frequently been held that to constitute a judgment there must be pleadings, monition and a bearing. (Sawyer v. Insurance Co., 12 Mass. 291 and other cases in Beale's
Ca;es in Co11f!ict of Laws, HI, 294 ff.) Executive judgments, judgments by commissions,
entries to which a statute gives the effect of judgments, and similar near-judgments
arc, of course, not in~luded in the purview of this constitutional clause. (Foote v.
Newell, 29 Mo. 400; Nouvion v. Freeman, IS App. Cases I.) That a similar weakness
inheres in judgments where too much freedom is allowed in the shaping and reshaping
of issues at :ind after the trial, is illustrated in Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254There Brewer, J., speaking for the court says: "The invalidity of the judgment depends
upon the fact that it is in r.o manner responsive to the issues tendered by the pleadings.
This idea underlies all litigation. Its emphatic language is, that a judgment, to be
conclusive upon the parties to the litigation, must be responsive to the matters controverted. * " * \Vben a r.omplaint tenders one cause of action, and in that suit service on,
or appearance of, the defendant is made, a subsequent judgment therein, rendered in
the absence o: the defendant, upon another and different cause of action than that stated
in the complaint, is without binding force within the courts ~f the same state; and, ot
course, notwithstanding the constitutional provision heretofore quoted, has no better
standir.g in the courts of another state."
1•
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soon enough be reminded that freedom in interpretation is a violation of their oath of office. ''What the professors coolly propose to
the judges" says an irate practitioner, "is the commission of impeachable offenses." 11 This is the crux of the matter: Legislatures
must learn that only in so far as they are wining to give a wide
range of discretion to trial courts, can logic be made to yield to
common sense in pleading. If they have the will to do it the means
can easily be found. An infusion of common sense into pleading
may come by granting or confirming a free rule-making power in
the courts as has been done in England.12 It may come through such
legislation as we are getting in some of the code states to prevent
reviews and reversals in higher courts on pleading questions.111 It
may come through a withdrawal by act of the legislature of all
formal requirements in pleadings-or through a combination of all
of these plans as in Michigan. But it cannot come any more rapidly
or thoroughly or endure more permanently than the emancipation of
the judiciary from the jealousy of the legislature even in an age
when the tendency is all towards the reign of common sense.
NATHA:N" ISAACS.

Cincinnati Law School.
ll John Maxey Zane, in 16 Michigan Law Review, 309.
12 I need hardly refer to the Studies in English Civil Procedure by Samuel Rosenbaum in 63 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, or his book, The Rule :Making Au·
thority in the English Supreme Court, 1917.
13 The American codes contained a provision to that effect.
Thus: "The court, in
every stage of an action, must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment
shall be reversed, or afftcted, by reason of such error or defect." ( § 138 of the code as
adopted in Ohio, 1853). This was one of the sections that fared badly at the hands of
the courts. All errors were presumed to be prejudicial. In 1911 Ohio added to this
section of the code the following language: "In the judgment of any reviewing court
upon any petition in error in any civil action, when it is sought to reverse any final
judgment or decree or obtain a new trial upon the· issues joined in the pleadings, such
reviewing court shall certify on its journal whether or not in its opinion substantial jus·
tice has been done the party complaining, as shown by the record of the proceedings,
and judgment under review. In case such reviewing court shall determine and certify
that in its opinion substantial justice has been done to the party complain;ng as shown
by the record, all alleged errors occurring at the trial shall by such re,•iewing court be
deemed not prejudicial to the party complaining and shall be disregarded and such judg·
ment or decree under review shall be affirmed, or it shall be modified if in the opinion
of such reveiwing court a modification thereof will ·do more complete justice to the
"arty complaining. In case such reviewing court shall determine and certify that in its
opinion substantial justice has not been done to the party complaining as shown by the
record such reviewing court shall proceed as provided in Section 12272 of the General
Code." (General Code, Section I 1364.)
That there i> a tendency now to respect the spirit of this provision may be seen in
almost any volume of the recent decisions of a code state. For example, refusals to
grant reversals for errors on the ground that they are not prejudicial are recorded in 87
Ohio State at pages 401, 460, 477 and 479.

